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A Better Carrot
Incentivizing Patent Reexamination
by JAMES W. BEARD*
I. Introduction
Almost three decades ago, Congress created by statute the
modern patent reexamination system.' By providing an
administrative mechanism to challenge the validity of patents,
reexamination was intended to serve as an inexpensive alternative to
full litigation. However, the system, as it currently functions, lacks
the power and scope to be a viable alternative to such litigation, and
the relative dearth of reexaminations shows that parties threatened
with, or involved in, litigation overwhelmingly choose to attempt
invalidation of patents in court. Most critical analyses of the
reexamination system focus on modifying the existing provisions of
the Patent Act to address the core deficiencies of the process.2 While
* Research Fellow, University of California, Hastings Law & Bioscience Project;
J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; B.A.,
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey Lefstin for his
tutelage and feedback, Professor Robin Feldman (University of California, Hastings
College of the Law) for her continuing advice and guidance, and the staff of the Hastings
Science & Technology Law Journal for their work on this piece.
1. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 22 (stating that the
reexamination process finally passed into law in 1980).
2. See, e.g., Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation
of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition - And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 113-19 (1998) (identifying expanded use of non-
documentary sources such as prior use, knowledge or invention as well evidence of failure
to comply with the disclosure requirement as possible reforms); Dale L. Carlson & Robert
A. Migliorini, Patent Reform at the Crossroads: Experience in the Far East with
Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the United States, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
261, 312 (2006) (proposing expansion of the scope of considered evidence in inter partes
proceedings to include additional written documents, interviews, limited discovery tools,
expert affidavits, and oral hearings of parties, witnesses, and experts); Janis, supra 1, at
118-22 (advocating the abandonment of formal attempts to reform the reexamination
system, and instead implement a more comprehensive inter partes system akin to the
European Patent Convention post-grant opposition and U.S. trademark inter partes review
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these modifications are doubtlessly a key element of any successful
reform, they fail to address a more fundamental deficiency in the
schema.
The current reexamination procedures are premised on the
assumption that firms are actively engaged in reading, learning from,
and analyzing patents.3 In such an environment, reexamination would
be a far more attractive solution by affording a low-pressure and low-
cost means to reevaluate the strength of a patent. In reality, the
behavior of firms runs counter to the above assumption as parties
avoid the reading and appraisal of issued patents as a defense to
willful infringement and the consequent treble damages.4 Thus, any
successful reform to the reexamination system must overcome this
institutional inertia, and encourage firms to read and analyze active
patents.
The incentive structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act, though
initially implemented to address a number of issues not relevant to
other patentable subject matter, illustrates the potential for non-
traditional incentive schemes. This Note will examine the origins and
development of patent reexamination, its current implementation as
part of the Patent Act, and possible reforms that would serve the
fundamental interest in increasing the strength of issued patents and
ensuring a dynamic and active intellectual property market.
II. The Origins of Modern Administrative Opposition
A. The Path to Reexamination
The modern reexamination system grew out of a discussion that
began in 1966, with the publication of the Report on the President's
Commission on the Patent System. The Report' was targeted at
general reforms of the patent system, and included proposals for pre-
and post-issuance opposition, but many professionals doubted the
efficacy of the measures.6 In 1974, the American Bar Association
systems); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 763, 776-83 (2002) (suggesting pre-grant publication of patent applications 90
days after the first office action in order to encourage pre-grant opposition challenges).
3. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085-87 (2003) (describing the disclosure function as a foundation
of the patent system); cf. id. at 1101-02 (discussing the social effect of willful ignorance).
4. See id. at 1087-88 (describing the effect of willful ignorance of patents, with firms
avoiding reading competitor's patents in order to avoid enhanced damages).
5. Soobert, supra note 2, at 82.
6. Id. at 83.
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proposed a similar, though narrower, reform that required prior art
and publications to be presented to the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") for consideration before the sources could be used in a court
invalidity proceeding.
The first significant legislative action targeted at patent
reexamination began in 1974.' Though the bill stalled after referral to
the Committee on the Judiciary,9 it included numerous provisions that
were echoed and built upon in later proposals.1  Notably, the
provisions of the bill allowed for third parties to request
reexamination of active patents via citation of prior art patents and
printed publications bearing on the enforceability of the patent." The
challenger was required to pay a fee for the reexamination, but was
strictly limited to the citation of prior art.
12
Five years later Senator Bayh (D-Indiana) introduced Senate Bill
(S.)1679, entitled the Patent Law Amendments of 1979.13 The
Amendments included reforms directed at the reexamination process,
instructing the PTO to create regulations governing "(1) the citation
to the [PTO] of prior art patents or publications... and (2) the
reexamination of a patent to determine whether such a prior patent
or publication has any bearing on the patentability of any claim," and
allowed any third party to "(1) cite to the [PTO] any such prior
patent; and (2) request such a reexamination."'' 4 Importantly, the bill
also included a provision that declared "no prior patent or publication
may be relied upon as evidence of nonpatentability in a civil action
involving the validity or infringement of a patent" unless the prior art
had been submitted to the PTO as per the bill's provisions, or in cases
where such consideration without submission would serve the
interests of justice. I
7. Id.
8. N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for
Change Based on a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945, 947
(1994) (discussing Senator Fong's introduction of Senate Bill 4259, which proposed an ex
parte reexamination process).
9. Soobert, supra note 2, at 83.
10. See id. at 84-85 (discussing provisions of the Patent Modernization Act).
11. Id. at 84.
12. Id.
13. Summary of S. 1679, A Bill to Amend the Patent Laws, Title 35 of the United States
Code, reported at S. Rept. 96-617, 4 Mar. 1980, available at www.thomas.loc.gov (last
visited 21 Dec. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Summary ofS. 1679].
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Additionally, the bill established criteria that allowed a court in a
civil action to stay proceedings while a request for reexamination was
pending, but used permissive language-that is, there was no
requirement for the court to stay proceedings until the PTO had
made a determination of validity or invalidity. Thus, while the bill
did not expressly require that prior art be submitted via the
reexamination process, nor require stays of proceedings in civil
actions while the PTO considered validity challenges, it did attempt
to establish a comprehensive framework for patent reexamination.
On March 20, 1980, the measure was indefinitely postponed in the
Senate, effectively killing the measure, but together S. 4259 and S.
1679 created the backdrop for the first successful reexamination
proposal.
17
B. The Modern Schema
On May 26, 1980, just six days after S. 1679 was tabled,
Representative Kastenmeier (D-Wisconsin) introduced House
Resolution 6933, entitled the Government Patent Policy Act of 1980,
which was signed into law nine months later as Public Law 96-517 and
codified as part of the Patent Act.'8 While the bill adopted some of
the provisions of the earlier attempts, such as allowing limited third-
party participation and usage of prior patent art and publications in
the proceedings, it excluded the mandatory and permissive referrals
to the PTO of prior art during civil litigation that appeared in S.
1679.19 Although narrower in impact than the earlier measures, the
Patent Policy Act effectively created the patent reexamination
procedure as it exists and is implemented today.
The current procedure for patent reexamination is codified as
sections 301 to 307 of the Patent Act, and it allows for limited third-
party involvement in reexamination proceedings, which are
constrained to consideration of narrow categories of evidence.2 The
sections allow for a potentially valuable alternative to full litigation of
patent validity, but in practice litigants have opted, in most cases, to
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Summary of H.R. 6933, An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, 20
Nov. 1980, available at www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited 21 Dec. 2008) (on file with
author).
19. Soobert, supra note 2, at 87.
20. See In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1397 (1996) (observing that the
reexamination provision allows "[n]o grounds of reexamination ... other than [those]
based on new prior art and sections 102 and 103").
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pursue invalidity via civil litigation rather than through reexamination
proceedings, despite the difference in cost.
C. Structure of the Code
1. Ex Parte Reexamination
As currently implemented, the reexamination procedure
establishes two mechanisms for third parties2' to challenge the validity
of an issued patent. First, the challenger can cite prior art, consisting
of patents or printed publications only, to the PTO.22 If the challenger
is able to explain "in writing the pertinency and manner of applying
such prior art to at least one claim of the prior art," the prior art
becomes part of the official file of the patent . Challengers citing
prior art under section 301 can opt to have their identity excluded
from the patent file, and thereby hide their involvement from the
patentee. 24  In cases where the challenger produces products or
utilizes methods that potentially read on the patent at issue,
anonymity serves to encourage participation by minimizing exposure.
The second method of third-party action, a direct request for
reexamination, allows the challenger to initiate reexamination by the
PTO on the basis of any artwork cited under section 301.2' The
challenger must submit a request in writing, accompanied by the
payment of a reexamination fee-currently $2,520 for an ex parte
proceeding -and include an explanation of the pertinency and
manner in which the prior art impacts the patent at issue. Unlike
section 301 citation, however, requests for reexamination are not kept
confidential, and the name of the challenging party becomes part of
21. Importantly, a patentee may choose to initiate a reexamination proceeding on
their own, and often do-data shows that patentees have initiated about 40 percent of ex
parte reexamination proceedings. J. Steven Baughman, Reexamining Reexaminations: A
Fresh Look at the Ex parte and Inter partes Mechanisms for Reviewing Issued Patents, 89 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 349, 354 (2007). This mechanism gives patentees a
means to submit newly discovered prior art and confirm the validity of a patent,
reaffirming the strength of a patent in a low cost environment. See id. This Note does not
address patentee-initiated reexamination, however, and instead focuses on adversarial use
of the system as an alternative to invalidity litigation.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
26. 37 C.F.R. 1.20(c)(1) (2008).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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the patent's official record.28  Upon receiving the reexamination
request, the PTO sends a copy of the request to the owner of the
patent. >
Once the request has been received by the PTO, the Director
must "determine whether a substantial new question of patentability"
that bears on any claim of the patent is raised by the request and the
submitted prior art." This prevents the reexamination process from
being used as a vexatious administrative proceeding to harass
patentees by requiring the Director to first determine if subjecting the
patent to reexamination is necessary. 31 Importantly, the Act expressly
provides that previous examination of the submitted prior art by the
PTO-for example, if the submitted prior art had been part of the
initial examination of the patent-does not bar a submission from
raising such a substantial new question of patentability.12 This allows
for challengers to illustrate the reasons for invalidity via the written
statement accompanying the prior art, prospectively where the PTO
failed to recognize such reasons.
Upon a finding that the submission raises a substantial new
question of patentability, the patentee is given two months to respond
to the challenge via submission of a statement." In the response, the
patentee is also allowed to file amendments to the patent, including
"new claims he may wish to propose, for consideration in the
reexamination, ,3 provided that such amendments do not enlarge the
scope of the patent claim." Amendments during reexamination
proceedings are thereby limited to refining and narrowing the scope
in light of new prior art to prevent the claim as a whole from a finding
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
31. See infra Part 0 for additional discussion on the intended balance between
encouraging challenges to active patents and preventing harassment of patentees.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2006) ("[t]he existence of a substantial new question of
patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was
previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office"); see also Baughman,
supra note 21, at 350 (stating that even the prior art previously submitted and considered
by the Patent Office can give rise to substantial new questions of patentability).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
34. Id.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006) ("No proposed amendment or new claim enlarging the
scope of a claim of a patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding under this
chapter"); see also Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584,36 USPQ 2d 1162,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1567 (1996) (holding claims at issue invalid
because the scope had been broadened in reexamination).
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of invalidity in litigation. After the patentee files a response, the
challenger is given two months to submit a reply, at which point its
participation in the process comes to an end.6
The reexamination begins after the times for filing the various
responses and replies have expired, and is conducted according to the
procedures for initial examination. Once the reexamination has
begun, neither party can abort itB -it concludes only when the PTO
has issued a new certificate declaring the patent valid or canceling any
unpatentable claims. The decision is appealable to the Board of
411Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") by the patent owner.
2. Inter Partes Reexamination
Although many of the procedures for inter partes reexamination
follow those of ex parte reexamination outlined above, the provisions
differ in several key respects. First incorporated into the Patent Act
through the American Inventors Protection Act in 1999, Congress
intended inter partes reexamination to serve as an "expanded means
for third parties to challenge the validity of a patent" and provide for
increased involvement by the challenger during the proceedings. 4 As
a prefatory distinction, the cost of an inter partes proceeding is higher,
requiring that the challenger pay $8,800 to initiate the
reexamination.4
The extent of the increase in involvement is not substantial,
however, and primarily takes the form of increased notice and
communication with the challenging party regarding the proceedings.
Specifically, the Act requires the Office to send the challenger a copy
of any communication regarding the patent at issue.43 In cases where
the patent owner replies to the Office's communications, the
challenger may opt to respond to both the Office's original
communication and the owner's response within thirty days.44 As
opposed to the ex parte proceedings, where the challenger was limited
36. 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2006).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006).
38. See Soobert, supra note 2, at 96-97 ("Once the reexamination proceeding is
commenced, the proceeding may not be abandoned and will always result in the issuance
of a reexamination certificate.").
39. 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2006).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2006); accord. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006).
41. Carlson, supra note 2.
42. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(2) (2008).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(1) (2006).
44. See id. § 314(b)(2).
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to a single response directly addressing the patentee's reply to the
challenge, inter partes proceedings allow the challenger to make
numerous responses stemming from any issues raised by the Office
during its examination of the submitted art.4
Perhaps most importantly, an inter partes proceeding affords the
challenging party the same right to appeal the decision to the BPAI as
the patentee.46  However, the tradeoff for this right of appeal is a
limited estoppel against the challenging party-where the request for
reexamination results in a reissued certificate, the challenger "is
estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action.., the
invalidity of any claim determined to be valid and patentable on any
ground which the third party requester raised or could have raised
during the proceedings" (emphasis added).4 While the section allows
for challenges in civil litigation based on new grounds, the estoppel
effect of section 315(c) does serve as a potential deterrent for third
party challengers.
III. Policy Interests in Reexamination
A. Initial Aims and Objectives
As originally contemplated by Congress, the reexamination
procedure was intended to address and mitigate three central
concerns regarding the strength and validity of active patents.4' First,
the reexamination procedure was intended to "settle validity disputes
more quickly and less expensively than the often protracted litigation
involved in such cases., 49  Over the past three decades, the
reexamination procedure has indeed proven to be far less costly than
full litigation proceedings. While a reexamination proceeding can
cost, on average, as little as $55,000,5o) the cost of full litigation can be
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2006); and cf. § 304 (2006).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2006).
47. See id. § 315(c).
48. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing the
benefits of reexamination as stated by the measure's proponents); see also Patent
Reexamination: Hearings on S. 1679 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1979) (comments of Sen. Bayh that reexamination would permit courts to defer to
the PTO for patent validity questions); 126 Cong. Rec. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) ("[The bill would] "reverse the current decline in U.S. productivity by
strengthening the patent and copyright systems to improve investor confidence in
technology.").
49. Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 602.
50. Aparna Mathur, "Courting Trouble on Patents," THE AMERICAN, 29 July 2008,
available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/uly-07-08/courting-trouble-on-patents;
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orders of magnitude higher-a 2003 survey found the average patent
litigation suit to cost $2 million.1 This savings comes at a strategic
price, with the challenger limited by the forms of evidence considered
and the lack of discovery, expert witnesses, and other accoutrements
of a full trial. 2 Although much of the cost difference stems from
these very limitations, the unavailability of some forms of evidence
during reexamination may have a significant effect on the potential
outcome.
Second, Congress saw the reexamination procedure as a means
to allow courts to "refer patent validity questions to the expertise of
the Patent Office.",13 District court judges are required to preside
over all manner of cases, and are often unfamiliar with the highly
technical and knowledge intensive aspects of high technology patents.
For example, in the recent case of LSI Industries, Inc. v. ImagePoint,
Inc., Judge William 0. Bertelsman stated "I get a patent case about
every three years. In the 27 years, I've only had about five of them." 4
In contrast, the PTO has clear experience interpreting complex
technical claims and administrating the strictures of the Patent Act,
and so deferring preliminary questions of patentability to the Office
encourages institutional efficiency.
Third, the reexamination system was intended to produce
economic benefits. The modern patent system operates to protect
and monetize the intellectual property of firms and individual
inventors. The incidental effect of this nature is that patent
portfolios, and consequentially the size, strength, and breadth of
those portfolios, becomes an important indication of the firm's
market potential and worth. Thus, Congress hoped that
"reexamination would reinforce 'investor confidence in the certainty
of patent rights' by affording the PTO a broader opportunity to
see also Steven J. Frank, "Patent Reform Cacophony," IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE, Dec.
2005, http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/dec05/2349 (last visited 18 Dec. 2008) ("A
reexamination proceeding can cost each side $10,000 to $100,000, and oppositions will
almost certainly cost more, since a much wider range of evidence will be considered.").
51. William J. Bill Robinson, "IP Litigation Strategies: Patents: Markman Hearings
(Part 2)," FINDLAW.COM, http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Sep/30/133071.html (last visited
April 28, 2009).
52. See Soobert, supra note 2, at 88-89 (describing the limitations on evidence
considered by the PTO during reexamination proceedings).
53. Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 602 (citing Senator Birch Bayh, Patent Reexamination:
Hearings on S. 1679 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979)).
54. LSI Industries, Inc. v. Image Point, Inc., Nos. 2007-1292,-1293,-1294,-1295, slip op.
at 5 (Fed. Cir. 2008), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions/07-1292.pdf.
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review 'doubtful patents."' 5 By increasing the ease with which weak
patents could be challenged and invalidated, those patents that
remained in effect could be afforded a stronger presumption of
validity by investors and could be relied on to a greater extent by
firms in the development of business models, resulting in increased
predictability in the market and greater investment.
At the same time, however, reexamination must balance the
interests in increasing the ease with which weak patents could be
narrowed or invalidated with the interest in protecting the rights
afforded to valid patents. In drafting the modern schema, Congress
"recognized that [these policy interests in reexamination] must be
balanced against the potential for abuse, whereby unwarranted
reexaminations can harass the patentee and waste the patent life."'
' 6
If the standards for opposition reexamination were set too low, such
proceedings could be used to harass patent owners, to coerce them
into unfavorable cross-licensing agreements, discourage investment in
new high-technology startups by casting a pall over their nascent
portfolio, or driving small companies completely out of business.
The current code includes safeguards against such vexatious
behavior, including most notably the requirement that the submitted
prior art raise substantial new questions of patentability57  This
requirement serves to "protect patentees from having to respond to
or participate in unjustified reexaminations. ' 's  Additionally, the
provisions that limit the forms of evidence considered to prior patent
art and publications, as well as limitations on the grounds for
reexamination to considerations of invalidity for lack of novelty and
non-obviousness," serve a similar gatekeeping function. By
restricting the scope of the proceedings to evidence and subject
matter that the PTO deals with on a procedural basis, a patent owner
can opt to forego participation-though, perhaps to its detriment in
some cases-relying instead on the strength of its patent to overcome
any submitted prior art. The prohibition on participation by the
challenger unless the patent owner files a response to the submitted
55. Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 602 (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 29,895 (1980) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier)).
56. In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d at 1397.
57. 35 U.S.C. §304 (2006).
58. Id. at 1397 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462).
59. Id. ("No grounds of reexamination were to be permitted other than based on new
prior art and sections 102 and 103").
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art, both in ex parte and inter partes proceedings, furthers this
mechanism by allowing the patent owner to completely forego
participation in the reexamination. For small companies, this can
substantially lessen the impact of vexatious challenges, and any
proposed reforms must keep the effect of such mechanisms in mind.
B. The Policy Goals of Reform
Over the years, numerous measures for reforming the patent
reexamination process have been proposed."' Many such proposals
have often focused, at least in large part, on one perceived
shortcoming of the current reexamination system: the restrictions on
allowable evidence considered by the PTO during the proceedings."
While such reforms may prove a significant benefit in reexamination
proceedings, they also affect the cost of the proceeding. Expanding
the scope of evidence considered by the PTO may improve the odds
of a successful administrative challenge, but it would also increase the
cost of the proceeding by requiring additional research and analysis of
sources-especially the use of experts and discovery, even if in a
limited capacity-currently restricted to invalidity actions. Thus,
while proposals to expand the scope of evidence may encourage
increased utilization of reexamination proceedings, they do so by
creating a petty trial, administered by the PTO.
Even assuming that such broad traditional reforms were
implemented at the PTO, firms may still be unlikely to opt for
administrative revocation proceedings. Thus, the proposal outlined in
this Note seeks to encourage greater use of reexamination
proceedings by considering non-traditional incentives. As a threshold
goal, any reform should seek to preserve at minimum, and increase if
possible, the three policy interests sought by the original
implementation of the reexamination procedure-reducing the
expense of validity disputes, deference to the PTO on difficult
questions, and increasing investor confidence in the system. To be
60. See generally Soobert, supra note 2; Janis, supra note 1; Carlson, supra note 2;
Kesan, supra note 2; Baughman, supra note 21. 'Please note that while these sources
contain a number of interesting proposals for reform of administrative proceedings,
consideration of these additional measures exceeds the scope of this Note.
61. See, e.g., Soobert, supra note 2, at 68, 113-19 (calling for consideration of evidence
on all statutory bases for invalidity, including non-documentary sources such as evidence
of prior use, knowledge or invention); Carlson, supra note 2, at 312 (proposing expansion
of the scope of considered evidence in inter partes proceedings to include additional
written documents, interviews, limited discovery tools, expert affidavits, and oral hearings
of parties, witnesses, and experts).
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successful, a reexamination reform should accomplish two additional
interests: increasing participation in administrative opposition
proceedings and increased reading of patents.
1. Increased Participation in Administrative Opposition Proceedings
The current system has in many ways accomplished, at least in
part, the initial intentions of Congress. However, in the years since
reexamination became an option for third parties, it has yet to prove
itself a viable and attractive option for challenging the validity of a
patent. With the number of active patents currently involved in
litigation estimated at 1.9 percent," with "valuable" patents subject to
substantially higher rates of litigation," the utilization of the
reexamination process is insignificant at best. In 2008, a mere 316 out
of only 680 requests for ex parte reexamination filed (about 46-
PERCENT) were known to have related litigation. Conversely, out
of 168 requests for inter partes reexamination, 115 (roughly 68-
percent) were known to have related litigation.6 5 During the same
period, the Office issued a total of 182,556 patents and accepted
applications for 495,095 patents.66 Regardless of the measure, it is
clear that the number of reexamination requests is an almost
inconsequential share of the total number of patents involved in
litigation. The impact is clear-both potential and defendant
infringers are unlikely to utilize the reexamination system, opting
instead to forego administrative proceedings in favor of invalidity
litigation.
62. Mathur, supra note 50.
63. "Characteristics of patent litigation: A window on competition," RAND Journal
of Economics, (SPRING 2001), available at https://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/73891265.html ("For the most "'valuable' drugs and health patents, the estimated
probability of litigation during the lifetime of the patent is more than 25-percent, and
more than 10-percent in the other technology fields. As a percentage of utilized patents,
these litigation rates would be even higher").
64. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
AccoUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, 127 (2008), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf.
65. Id. While the percentage of inter partes proceedings with attendant litigation is
higher than that of ex parte requests, given the relatively small number of overall requests
it seems likely that parties opt for inter partes proceedings when they are already subject to
estoppel issues-i.e. when they are already involved in litigation-rather than opting for
inter partes proceedings on the basis of the prospect for increased involvement. This,
combined with instances of self-submission of an exparte reexamination request by patent
owners to refine patent claims, should largely resolve the differences in the observed
utilization.
66. Id. at 62.
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Given the substantial difference in cost, and assuming that the
participants in the system are rational actors, the most likely
explanation is that potential and defendant infringers are choosing
full invalidity litigation because it allows them presentation of
additional forms of evidence, discovery, expert witnesses, and
broader means for invalidating a patent beyond the anticipation and
non-obviousness criterion allowed under in the process. Under the
current system, parties already involved in litigation appear reticent
to initiate inter partes proceedings, and parties not so involved appear
unwilling to initiate either form of challenge. Although statistics and
motives to explain such behavior are unavailable, it seems imminently
likely that on the part of inter partes litigation, parties already faced
with the effect of estoppel and the cost of full litigation would see
little benefit in initiating duplicative proceedings that afforded a
narrower prospect for invalidating the patent claims at issue.
Conversely, parties not involved in litigation would face a
significant risk bringing either manner of opposition given the
requirement that the challenger's name become part of the patent's
official record. The parties with the most knowledge regarding the
potential invalidity of a patent are likely those with commercial
interests at stake in the outcome of that validity determination. As a
result, the parties most likely to succeed and have some motivation to
bring a reexamination challenge are the same parties with the greatest
disincentive to do so-initiating the proceeding, and thereby making
itself known to the patent owner, exposes the party to a costly
infringement lawsuit.
2. Increased Patent Reading and Review
Ostensibly, one of the primary purposes of the patent system is
to contribute knowledge and technology to the public domain.6 Even
if a patent applicant has made an invention that is truly new, useful,
and non-obvious, the patent will be denied (or can be invalidated if
granted) if the patent does not properly enable others to practice the
subject matter.8 The monopoly granted to the inventor is therefore a
trade: a period of exclusivity granted in exchange for the knowledge
needed to practice the invention. When the patent term expires, the
67. See John M. Olin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2008 (2005) (introducing the "twin purposes" of the
patent system).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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knowledge is ceded back to the public domain for use by other
inventors and firms.
However, knowledge can sometimes be a liability: if an infringer
is found to have known about a valid patent, and acted without a
reasonable basis for believing the patent invalid, they can be subject
to enhanced damages.69 As a general rule, treble damages are only
granted when the fact-finder determines the infringement was
willful-that is, that the infringing party knew of the patent and had
no reasonable basis to believe its actions were not infringing.7" This
heightened liability has a perverse effect, discouraging companies
from reading-and thereby learning from-the patents of their
competitors, eliminating the purported benefit of the disclosure
function of the patent system.71  A primary concern for any new
reexamination reform procedure must therefore be the mitigation of
this institutional impetus and the incentivization of both
reexamination processes in order to increase third party participation,
while preserving and furthering the original aims and objectives
enumerated by Congress.
IV. The Unexamined Patent Is Not Worth Litigating...
Most analyses of and proposals for the current reexamination
system have focused on several central aspects of the process, such as
the extent of third-party participation and involvement in
examination, the forms of evidence considered during
reexamination, and the estoppel effect of reexamination validity
determinations on third parties in subsequent litigation and appealsi 4
While adjusting these aspects of the system may increase third-
party utilization of the procedure, there is a limit to the extent they
69. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
70. See Joshua Stowell, Willful Infringement and the Evidentiary Value of Opinion
Letters after Knorr-Bremse v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 1 (2005); see also
Andrew M. Newton, Encouraging Willful Infringment? Knorr-Bremse Leaves Due Care in
Patent Litigation in a State of Flux, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 91, 93-94 (2006)
(introducing willful damages for infringement).
71. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1087-88.
72. See Soobert, supra note 2, at 108-13 (criticizing the current system as unduly
limiting third party participation); id. at 125-27 (arguing the need to expand grounds for
validity challenges).
73. See id. at 113-15 (arguing that "nondocumentary evidence of prior art, such as
evidence of prior use" may prove persuasive in new technology areas).
74. See Janis, supra note 1, at 81-86 (discussing the effects of issue preclusion in the
current system).
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can be modified without undercutting the administrative nature of the
reexamination procedure. Allowing greater third-party involvement
in ex parte proceedings, for example, would conflate the process with
inter partes proceedings, which already afford greater involvement by
the challenger. 75 Similarly, while expanding the evidence that
challengers could cite to the PTO and allowing consideration of
additional grounds of invalidity-such as lack of enablement under
section 112-holds promise, to expand the scope of such allowances
too significantly would exceed the administrative scope of the
proceeding. One of the principal benefits of the reexamination
process is the relatively low cost of the proceeding. Allowing parties
to engage in citation of non-documentary evidence akin to that
allowed during litigation, including expert witnesses or evidence
gained through extensive discovery, would drastically increase the
cost of reexamination and thereby nullify the benefits of the
administrative action.
Finally, while third parties involved in an ex parte challenge are
not estopped by the Act from asserting invalidity challenges based on
cited prior art-as they are in inter partes proceedings-the art would
likely have less import in subsequent invalidity litigation once the
patent has survived a reexamination proceeding and the art has
become part of the patent's official file. Modifying the effects of the
statutory estoppel for participants in an inter partes proceeding, where
the parties are able to appeal the results of such proceedings to the
BPAI, would discourage challengers from appealing adverse validity
determinations through the proper channels.
A. Incentivizing Reexamination
Even assuming that the sources of evidence considered were
expanded to include other documentary and limited non-
documentary sources not requiring discovery, the participation of
third parties was increased, and the estoppel effect of both ex parte
and inter partes proceedings were limited so as to encourage
administrative invalidity actions over litigation, these measures are
unlikely to have a drastic impact. Patentees and potential
challengers, knowing the relative costs, benefits, and risks of both
processes, most often choose to determine invalidity issues in full
litigation. Where the cost of infringement can be tens, if not
75. See text accompanying notes 43-45.
76. See notes 62 to 66 and accompanying text.
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hundreds, of millions of dollars, it is likely that potential infringers
would in many cases still opt for litigation which, while more
expensive than the reexamination proceeding, still costs far less than
a finding of infringement.
Perhaps more importantly, the proposed reforms do little to
encourage active use of the reexamination system in cases where the
challenger is not threatened by or involved in civil litigation.
Currently willful infringement, where a firm discovers that its
products read on another's patents, can incur enhanced damages on
the infringer. Paired with the relatively minimal benefit created by
the disclosure of the patent itself-even if the patent discloses new
technology or techniques, the firm is still barred from practicing that
technology without a license-the system creates a perverse incentive
to discourage firms from reading patents.79  This dynamic makes it
unlikely that a firm, even where the prospect of invalidating a patent
is high, would even know of the patent's existence.
Herein lies the primary issue with the proposals that focus
principally on expanding the species of evidence considered by the
PTO in reexamination proceedings. In cases where the challenger is
already known to the patentee, and is either at risk for or involved in
infringement litigation, even broad reforms would do little to
encourage extensive use of an administrative reexamination
proceeding: faced with the cost of litigation regardless, the infringing
firm is more likely to broach the invalidity issue as part of the
litigation, where it benefits from more extensive discovery and an
expanded evidentiary scope not available in reexamination.
Alternatively, in cases where a party is not involved or threatened
with litigation, it will be unlikely to read patents for fear of enhanced
damages, and therefore unlikely to bring challenges at all.
77. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1481, 1541
(finding award of $909,457,567); City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc.,
123 Cal. App. 4th 306, 313 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004) (affirming award of $500,164,030); see
also "Settlement Reached in BlackBerry Patent Case: Research in Motion Pays NTP
$612.5 million; Devices Stay On," MSNBC.COM, 3 Mar. 2006, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/ 1659304/wid/1 1915829 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (describing a $612.5 million
settlement in the patent infringement case between RIM and NTP over the BlackBerry
system).
78. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Louis L. Wu, Comment: Enhanced Damages
for Willful Patent Infringement - An Issue for Judge or Jury?, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 435, 435
(1999) (discussing liability for treble damages for willful patent infringement).
79. See Olin, supra note 67, at 2023 (weighing the "low benefits and high expected
costs of investigating patent applications"); see also Lemley, supra note 3' (arguing that
willful blindness can serve as a defense against willful infringement).
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A successful modification of the reexamination system must do
more than merely increase the appeal of administrative challenges
once a party is threatened with litigation. Such improvements would
have de minimis impact on utilization, at least relative to the number
of patents involved in litigation. A truly powerful administrative
option must overcome the perverse incentive for "willful blindness"
by parties, and encourage them to actively read and challenge the
patents. N
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act8'
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act), which created a
powerful provision for encouraging invalidation of pharmaceutical
patents.8  Intended to encourage the development of generic
pharmaceuticals on the market, the Hatch-Waxman Act dealt with
the unique issues that generic drug makers faced in bringing their
products to market." Specifically, all pharmaceutical drugs must
obtain approval by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
before they can be brought to market. This process is expensive and
time consuming, and as a result few manufacturers sought approval to
produce generic versions of patented drugs.5 Those that did could
only begin the process at the conclusion of the drug's patent term,
which gave a de facto artificial extension to the life of the patent.
80. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1102 (noting that "experienced patent lawyers often
advise their clients to avoid reading patents in order to avoid liability for willfulness").
81. For an excellent introduction into the Hatch-Waxman Act and the issues with
potential collusive dealing, please see C. Scott. Hemphill, Paying for Delay -
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1553
(2006).
82. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 [hereinafter
Hatch-Waxman Act], Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355
and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d)-(h) (2003)).
83. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme
on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 166
(2005) (stating that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to facilitate generic drug entry
into the market).
84. Id. (discussing the introduction of a pre-market drug approval process requiring
demonstration of drug effectiveness and drug safety through the passage of the Drug
Amendments of 1962).
85. Douglas A. Robinson, Note: Recent Administrative Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman
Act: Lower Prices Now in Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation Later?, 81 WASH.
U. L. Q. 829, 831 (2003) (discussing the issues drug manufacturers face in bringing generic
versions to market).
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In order to redress this issue, Congress passed the Hatch-
Waxman Act, which allowed generic firms to "rely on the safety and
efficacy data compiled by the brand-name companies during the FDA
approval process" in the form of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA"), thereby reducing the cost of obtaining FDA
approval for the generic version." The Act allows for the filing of
four certification options, including a claim that the relevant patent is
invalid or, in the alternative, that the generic version does not infringe
the patent." This option, known as an ANDA paragraph IV
certification ("ANDA-IV), is categorized by statute as a technical act
of infringement, and the patentee can prevent the certification of the
generic by filing an infringement suit within 45 days.> The first
generic applicant who successfully files an ANDA-IV is granted 180
days of market exclusivity, effectively creating a duopoly.8 9
As a general mechanism, the Hatch-Waxman Act serves as a
powerful incentive to challenge the validity of a pharmaceutical
patent. In cases where the patent owner brings suit in response to the
ANDA-IV filing and the patent is declared invalid, the provisions
exclude other generic manufacturers from the certification process for
six months despite this invalidity."' The Act thereby sets an
interesting statutory precedent: where the interest of public policy is
to increase the number of challenges to a patent, Congress can create
a time-limited duopoly for the patentee and challenger even though
the fact that a finding of invalidity means that no monopoly should
have existed in the first place.
C. Applying Hatch-Waxman Incentivization
The incentive scheme provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act
illustrates the power of non-traditional solutions to encouraging
reexamination, and suggests one potential incentive scheme for
86. Id. at 834. Under the ANDA filing scheme, generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers must prove that the generic version uses the "same active ingredient, route
of administration, dosage form and strength .... [and show] that the generic drug is
'bioequivalent' to the relevant brand-name product." Id.
87. Id. at 835.
88. Id. at 835-36.
89. Hemphill, supra note 81, at 1566.
90. See Hemphill, supra note 81, at 1560 (stating that "[i]n the case of a determination
of invalidity or noninfringement, the generic firm enjoys a 180-day exclusive right to
market a generic version of the drug in competition with the innovator, effectively a
duopoly during that period, before other generic firms are permitted to enter the
market").
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product and method patents. Namely, Hatch-Waxman
incentivization could serve as a powerful incentive to competing firms
to challenge patents via reexamination. By granting a limited period
of exclusivity to the first firm to file a reexamination request,
Congress could encourage firms to actively read patents, analyze
them for weaknesses, and challenge their validity. However, if
applied to letters patent as a whole, the policy interest of the Hatch-
Waxman incentive structure must be modified. There are no
regulatory delays or costs concomitant with normal letters patent,
which served as the initial impetus for the Hatch-Waxman Act, but
the policy structure can be applied by analogy and suitably limited in
scope and duration. Perhaps most significantly, the very structure of
the already existent reexamination system serves to prevent the
manner of collusive agreements seen in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (hereinafter In re Cipro).
1. Pre-Litigation Restriction
In keeping with the general goals of reform outlined in Section 0,
supra, Hatch-Waxman incentives must be more carefully constrained
if applied to normative letters patent in order to encourage use of
reexamination challenges without allowing challengers to harass
patent owners. As an incentive structure aimed at encouraging firms
to actively read and challenge patents, the duopoly grant should not
be available for potential infringers who are involved in-or under
threat of-infringement litigation. Thus, in cases where an
infringement lawsuit has been filed, is pending, or is threatened, 91 the
alleged infringer would be barred from filing a request for
reexamination under the proposed incentive structure. Instead, the
alleged infringer would be restricted to challenges under the standard
reexamination procedures, and if the patent were found invalid, the
infringer would gain no duopoly interest but could freely practice the
claims of the patent. In such situations, the reexamination system
would still provide an attractive alternative to full litigation, especially
if enhanced with some of the possible reforms discussed in Section 0,
supra.
91. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (2007)
(holding that "where the patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment
plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that
which he claims a right to do" the Article III case or controversy requirement would be
met). The SanDisk standard would be a possible means to gauge whether a challenger's
request for reexamination was brought prior to actual or threatened litigation.
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2. Early Challenges
Similarly, given the strength of such an incentive structure, the
reward schema should be structured to encourage active reading and
early challenges of invalid patents. A reexamination proceeding
initiated at the conclusion of a patent's term does relatively little
public good, with the effect of the resulting duopoly serving primarily
to allow a second firm to establish a strong market position rather
than prevent market entrenchment by the patentee via the ceding of
the patent to the public domain. Clearly, at minimum, a challenge
initiated at the very end of a patent term should not allow a duopoly
that might extend the life of a patent beyond the original term.
Even if the relevant market becomes competitive after a patent is
declared invalid, a lengthy monopoly gained through an improperly
granted patent affords significant benefits to the firm even after the
patent is revoked.92 Restricting the duopoly grants to instances where
the challenger initiates proceedings during the earliest years of a
patent term-for example, the first 5 or 10 years after issuance-
would encourage early challenges before a firm holding an invalid
patent is able to substantially entrench its market position. In order
to encourage these early challenges to patent validity, the duopoly
reward should only be available for challenges brought during the
early years of a patent term.
D. Duopoly Rights & Remedies
Related to this point is the need for a properly limited term for
any duopoly resulting from a successful invalidity challenge.
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, there are notable
shortcomings in the application of the Hatch-Waxman Act that must
be included in any application of the Act's concepts to the current
discussion. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions, a generic
firm filing a successful ANDA-IV certification is granted a 180-day
exclusivity period wherein the FDA will delay approval of any other
firm's ANDA-IV. Importantly, the market exclusivity period is
granted as a result of the filing of the ANDA-IV certification, not as a
result of a successful invalidation of the underlying patent in litigation
following the certification request.)4  Thus, a first-to-file generic
92. See generally Rajshree Agarwal, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of
Competitive Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J. LAW & ECON. 161 (2001) (discussing patents and the
effects of market entrenchment on subsequent firms' entry into the market).
93. See Hemphill, supra note 81, at 1578.
94. See id. at 1578-79.
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manufacturer can still gain the 180-day market exclusivity if the
patent owner declines to bring suit for infringement." The de facto
duopoly is therefore created by a regulatory delay, rather than a
statutory grant of such market power-a significant characteristic that
will affect any application to normative letters patents. However,
regardless of the source of authority, it is a grant of significant market
power.
1. The Right to Exclude
This leads to the ultimate question: what remedies should be
available to the duopoly firms following a successful reexamination
challenge under this schema? Since, in most industries, there is no
functional public regulatory equivalent to the FDA that could bar
entry to the market by subsequent firms by delayed approval, the
enforcement mechanism for use of the invention during the duopoly
period must be private-that is, a cause of action for infringement.
The central issue, of course, becomes that an invalid patent cannot be
infringed, at least as the patent system is construed and organized
under current law. But that law stems from legislative action, based
on the guiding principle of the Patents and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, which states simply that "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."96 For letters patent, the intent of the Patent Act is to
promote the disclosure of new inventions-and the concomitant
scientific and technical knowledge behind their creation-by granting
a temporally limited monopoly.
In the context of the proposal outlined here, the invalidation of
the invention serves a parallel function, even if it represents a
paradigm shift from the current system. The relinquishment of the
monopoly, first in the form of a duopoly and then in the form of full
invalidation, returns the scientific and technical knowledge
circumscribed by the patent to the public domain. Once the
technology is free of the patent monopoly, other inventors are free to
use the products and methods to create derivative, improved
inventions. Therefore, even though such an exception to the
normative requirements of patentability, and allowing a limited
duopoly for invalidated patents, may initially seem antithetical to the
patent system, it serves to further promote innovation and invention
95. Id.
96. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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by accelerating the return of knowledge to the public domain, where
it can be utilized more effectively.
Even if allowing infringement actions during the duopoly period
is warranted and constitutional, the question of what remedies should
be available remains. A threshold issue, however, is which parties
would have standing to practice the patent and exclude others from
such practice during the term of the duopoly. While the patentees
right to exclude would clearly be reduced by the proposal, as it would
have no right to exclude the challenger from practicing the patent,
determining what remedies would be available during the duopoly
term is contingent on each party's respective rights during the period.
Although a period of joint ownership and power to exclude,
albeit brief, does potentially complicate the full exercise of rights
afforded by a patent, such complications are not unprecedented.97
The duopoly period might be properly analogized to situations of
joint inventorship, which presents many of the same issues and
illustrates surprising benefits of such a dynamic. Both the (former)
patentee and the successful challenger would necessarily have the
right to file causes of action for infringement during the duopoly
period, without which there would be no means to enforce the
duopoly right. Ironically, in such causes of actions the very
complications caused by a right to exclude held jointly would further
serve to facilitate market entry by additional firms, even during the
duopoly period.
In cases of joint inventorship, proper adjudication of an
infringement action requires that all owners of the patent be named
parties." While patents are granted in the form of a personal
property right, patents held jointly have typically been treated as a
form of common property and each owner treated as an indispensable
party under Rule 19.9' Where a joint owner of a patent refuses to join
an infringement action, courts will consequently dismiss the action in
97. See, e.g., Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (requiring all owners
of a patent be named in a suit for it to proceed); Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical
Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a license granted by a co-inventor
of the patent at issue was proper and allowed the licensee to practice the invention despite
having no license from the other co-inventor).
98. See Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (requiring that a suit for
infringement be brought in the patent owner's name).
99. Richard F. Cahaly, Note: At Each Other's Mercy: Do Courts Fairly Apply Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Protect Patent Co-Owner's Rights?, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 671,671,686 (2001).
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equity and in good conscience.1"' Applying these standards to the
duopoly at issue here, both the patentee and the challenger would
have equal interests in the enforcement of the right to exclude others
during the duopoly period. As such, courts would hold both parties
as indispensible parties until the expiration of the duopoly period,
and joinder would be required in order for either party to file an
infringement action against a third-party practitioner. If either party
refused to join the action, this structure would further encourage the
dissolution of the initial monopoly. Where the patentee and
challenger were unwilling, or unable, to join suit to enforce their
mutual right to exclude others, additional firms could enter the
market.
2. The Right to License
Related to and deriving from the parties' mutual right to exclude
others from practicing the invalidated patent is the right to license the
subject matter to others. Drawing once again upon the framework
provided by joint inventorship, courts have long held that any co-
inventors can properly license the invention for practice by a third
party irrespective of the wishes of the other inventors. Once the
PTO concluded the reexamination process, found the patent invalid,
and initiated the duopoly period, either party would be free to license
the subject matter to third parties. 112 Empowering both parties to
freely license the patent would improve competition in the market, by
both increasing the likelihood that licenses would be granted in the
first place and decreasing the resultant cost of such licenses. Many
third-party firms may opt to wait until the expiration of the duopoly
to enter the market, but the cost of the duopoly licenses would likely
be low due to their limited term and would allow competitors to begin
immediate commercialization of the subject matter. Market forces
would shape the costs and structure of any duopoly licenses, in most
cases facilitating the entry of additional firms into the market even
before the expiration of the duopoly.
100. See id. at 686.
101. See id.; see also generally Dale L. Carlson & James R. Barney, The Division of
Rights Among Joint Inventors: Public Policy Concerns After Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical, 39
IDEA 251 (1999); Cahaly, supra note 99, at 683 ("[P]atent co-owners' licensing
independence can preclude use of the involuntary plaintiff rule because a third party
cannot infringe a patent if that party holds a lawful license from one of the co-owners.").
102. Cf Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466; see also Cahaly, supra note 99, at 679 (stating that
"[a]bsent a private contract, patent co-owners may act independently regarding patent
licensing").
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3. Royalties
Having determined that both the patentee and challenger have
shared rights of exclusion and licensing for successfully invalidated
patents, the question becomes what remedies should be afforded the
parties in an infringement action against an unlicensed practitioner of
the subject matter. In cases of nominal infringement of valid patents,
the Patent Act provides that a patentee is entitled to no less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention."" This amount
mimics the amount the patentee could have obtained from the
infringing party if it had licensed the patent.1"4 Courts consider 15
factors, stemming from Second Circuit's opinion in Georgia-Pacific v.
United States Plywood, that focus on three principal concerns: "the
significance of the patented invention to the product and to market
demand, the royalty rates people have been willing to pay for this or
other similar inventions in the industry, and expert testimony as to
the value of the patent.""' This analysis aims to determine what value
the parties would have initially placed on the license for the patent.
Royalty payments would be just as valuable a remedy during the
duopoly as they currently are for patentees, and given the limited
term might present fewer issues. Even assuming the court properly
calculates the royalty rate, the royalty determination in nominal cases
of infringement necessarily assume that the parties would have been
willing to negotiate a license in the first instance.")' By virtue of this
assumption, the court ignores a variety of factors that could have, or
may have in fact, prevented a license agreement before the
infringement, such "competition between the parties, the effect of the
deal on other licensees, disagreements over the merits of the claim,
or-most significantly-the possibility that the patentee stood to lose
more than the defendant had to gain from licensing, so that no deal
was rational."""' In the context of a term-limited duopoly, however,
the exclusion of these considerations is less problematic. Since the
103. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). Courts may also award interest and costs to this amount.
Id.
104. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property Patent
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 2017-18 (2007) (discussing the
computation of a reasonable royalty).
105. Lemley, supra note 104, at 2018. See also George-Pacific v. United States
Plywood, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing the factors to be considered in
determining a reasonable royalty).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 2019-2020 (discussing the issues with royalty calculations).
108. See id. at 2019.
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purpose of the invalidation process is to break up improperly granted
monopolies, the interests of the patentee and challenger to exclude
others from competing in the market, or only allowing entry under
high royalty rates, should be given less weight. Instead, reasonable
royalty rates would provide fair compensation for the successful
reexamination proceeding, without unduly hampering other potential
market entrants.
4. Injunctive Relief
Courts also have latitude to grant injunctions according to "the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent," as long as the terms of such an injunction are reasonable.>°9
The grant of permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable
discretion by the court,11 and a court must weigh a variety of factors
before granting such relief and should do so "only where the
intervention of a court of equity 'is essential in order to effectually
protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.""'
Given the equitable nature of injunctive relief, it is especially
appropriate for application as remedy for duopoly infringement.
In order to obtain injunctive relief against duopoly infringement,
the court should consider the same factors as for normative
infringement. Namely, it should require the plaintiff demonstrate
"(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction."'' Case law is clear that there is no
automatic right to injunctive relief stemming from the statutory rights
afforded by the Patent Act's prohibition of use, manufacture, sale, or
offers to sell during the patent term, 113 but under the scope of the
proposal there would be a strong basis for granting a temporary
injunction for the term of the duopoly.
109. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
110. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
111. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (U.S. 1982) (citing Cavanaugh v.
Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)).
112. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 391.
113. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393 (drawing a parallel between relief for patent and
copyright infringement, and observing that "this Court has consistently rejected invitations
to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically
follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed").
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While all injunctions must be considered on a case-by-case basis,
certain elements would be present in any case of duopoly
infringement. The first prong, which requires the plaintiff
demonstrate irreparable injury, creates perhaps the biggest obstacle
to injunctive relief against duopoly infringement. 14  In Smith
International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., the Federal Circuit created a
presumption of irreparable harm provided the patentee makes a clear
showing that the patent at issue is valid and infringed.11 5 Clearly,
where the PTO has determined a patent invalid in the course of a
reexamination proceeding, courts could not rely on a "strong
showings of validity and infringement... [to establish] irreparable
harm from continued infringement of the patent." '' However, if
there were a statutory basis for the continuation of patent rights
during the duopoly period, then a similar analysis would apply and
irreparable harm presumed."'
The second prong, the inadequacy of monetary damages,
presents an interesting situation that is highly dependant on the
timing of the challenge. The underlying purpose behind the proposed
reexamination structure is the abolition of improper monopolies. As
such, the adequacy of monetary damages in the form of royalty
payments by third-party firms practicing the patent would fluctuate
based on the structure of the market. When the patent term has just
begun, and the patentee has little or no entrenchment in the market,
an injunction may be more appropriate than royalties. However, as
the period for special, incentivized challenges draws to a close, there
is a heightened need to break up the patentee's market
entrenchment. Thus as the patent matures, the court should be more
likely to find that royalty payments-which would allow the
proliferation of firms in the market and increase competition, while
still granting a reward to the challenger-would be an adequate
remedy.
114. See id. at 391 (requiring the plaintiff show irreparable injury).
115. 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Roy H. Wepner & Richard W. Ellis, The
Federal Circuit's Presumptively Erroneous Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 6 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147, 148 (2004) (discussing the presumption established by Smith
International v. Hughes Tool).
116. See Smith International, 718 F.2d at 1581.
117. Cf. id. at 1581 (discussing the policy behind holding that there is a presumption of
irreparable harm).
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In cases for infringement of a valid patent, evaluation of the
balance of hardships between the parties is typically fact-dependant. "'
Courts will consider the impact of an injunction on the various parties
before granting extraordinary relief."l While the balance of hardship
might not always weigh in favor of an injunction, and instead may
indicate another remedy is more appropriate, the temporal limits of
the duopoly period suggest that the hardship imposed on a third-party
infringer would be minimal.
Finally, public interest in the enforcement of the challenger's
short-term rights to limited exclusivity would weigh in favor of the
grant of a short-term injunction. If the duopoly schema were
implemented, it would codify and establish a clear public interest in
encouraging reexamination challenges, an incentive that would be
nullified if the resulting duopoly were unenforceable. In sum, the
short duration and nature of injunctions for the term of the duopoly
would make such extraordinary relief a suitable remedy.
5. Enhanced Damages
Given the structure of the proposed reform, it seems enhanced
damages would be exceedingly unfair in most cases. 2 Such damages
in nominal cases of infringement require a showing of deliberate or
intentional infringement, and the Federal Circuit has treated
willfulness as a form of mens rea.'2' The very nature of a successful
invalidation proceeding establishes a reasonable basis for any party to
believe its use non-infringing, and thus destroys the requisite mens
rea. While awarding enhanced damages in cases of duopoly
infringement might further incentivize firms to initiate reexamination
challenges by exposing them to greater liability, such a remedy
unfairly penalizes parties practicing what is, after all, an invalid
patent. The allowance of treble damages would thereby both
discourage the utilization of the subject matter and vitiate what would
have been a valid defense against an infringement action absent the
reexamination proceeding. Thus, as a general rule, enhanced
damages should not be allowed.
118. See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) (taking the relative size of the firms into consideration when finding the
balance of hardship weighed in favor of a permanent injunction against the larger firm's
continued practice of the patented subject matter).
119. See id.
120. For an overview of enhanced damages, see discussion supra Part 0
121. See Stowell, supra note 70, at 26.
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E. Defenses to Duopoly Infringement
Similar to the discussion on willful infringement damages, supra,
the temporary grant of a duopoly should not be construed to
introduce third parties to any additional liabilities beyond that
needed to incentivize reexamination challenges. Allowing alleged
infringers to assert many of the traditional bases of invalidity-e.g.,
prior art, obviousness, and failure to describe best mode or enable use
of the subject matter' 21 -would eviscerate the duopoly award. Once
the reexamination had determined the initial patent invalid, an
alleged duopoly infringer would need only to reassert the invalidity
claims of the initial challenger, and thereby avoid liability.
Consequently, defending against a claim of duopoly infringement
must differ from nominal infringement defenses. The structure of the
proposal requires that arguments on the traditional grounds of
invalidity in the absolute-i.e., the assertion of any prior art, evidence
of obviousness, etc. that proved invalidity-be barred, but it does not
preclude the specific assertion of such arguments. That is, if the
accused duopoly infringer can demonstrate that its own use,
knowledge, or publication of the relevant subject matter preceded the
issuance of the invalid patent-or, perhaps, preceded the knowledge
of the existence of the patent or its invalidation-then it should not
be prohibited from further practice of the patent, nor subjected to
new royalties.
F. Issues and Effects of the Proposal
1. Prevention of Collusive Arrangements
As applied to pharmaceutical patent challenges, the Hatch-
Waxman Act created a perverse incentive for the patent owner and
the first-to-file generic firm to reach collusive agreements that
circumvent the spirit of the Act.12 In the recent decision In re Cipro,
the generic firm reached an agreement with the patentee
pharmaceutical firm to withdraw its ANDA-IV certification request,
in exchange for "exclusion payments" by the patentee to the generic
firm and a six-month exclusive license arrangement at the end of the
patent term.124 Through the arrangement, the generic manufacturer
still enjoyed the six-month duopoly promised by the Hatch-Waxman
122. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103,112 (2006).
123. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
124. Id. at 1329.
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Act in cases of a finding of invalidity, and additionally benefited from
the exclusion payments. Conversely, the patent owner was able to
sustain its monopoly and maintain prices high enough to offset the
cost of the exclusion payments.' 25 The court found no violation of
antitrust laws, holding that the anticompetitive effects of such an
arrangement were within the monopoly power granted by the
patent. 126 The agreement, though adhering to the literal application of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby nullified the policy purpose of the
Act.
This statutory and regulatory structure has therefore led to the
risk of anticompetitive effects as implemented with pharmaceutical
patents. 12' However, the current structure of the reexamination
system functions to prevent the kind of collusive arrangements seen
in In re Cipro. Once a reexamination procedure has been initiated,
and the PTO has begun the examination, it cannot be abandoned by
either party and will inevitably result in a determination by the PTO
of validity or invalidity of all or some of the claims.2' Thus, as
opposed to the arrangement in In re Cipro where there was an
interest in encouraging parties to settle cases without litigation, a
proceeding initiated under this structure would not serve as a
potential impetus for collusive arrangements.
2. Philosophical Dissonance
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns, there is a final obstacle
to implementation of anything resembling Hatch-Waxman incentives
to normative letters patent: Such a proposal is in some ways dissonant
with the fundamental philosophy of the patent system as it exists in
the United States. Despite the potential power of such a reform to
incentivize pre-litigation reexamination challenges, it would require a
significant policy departure from the existing system. Modern patent
125. The payments made under the agreement totaled $398.1 million. Id. at 1329 n.5.
Considering that Cipro is one of the best selling antibiotics in the world and the first to
earn Bayer $1 billion in annual sales, the payment to Barr represented only a fraction of
one year's sales, much less the potential profit enjoyed by Bayer through the remainder of
the monopoly. See In re Cipro Cases I & I, 121 Cal. App. 4th 402, 406 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist. 2004) (stating that Cipro earned Bayer $1 billion in annual sales).
126. Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336; cf In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding an antitrust violation where the generic manufacturer did not relinquish the 180-
day period after entering into a similar agreement, as such behavior delayed the entry of
other manufacturers).
127. See, e.g., In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (2003); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (2008).
128. See text accompanying notes 37-40.
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law is based on the grant of limited monopolies to parties that
disclose new, useful, and nonobvious inventions.129 If such reforms
were implemented, and challengers granted a duopoly-even if for
only a short period as in the case of the Hatch-Waxman Act-as a
reward for successful challenges to product patents, it would
effectively issue market exclusivity for technology or know-how that
admittedly belongs to the public domain. While this is a drastic
departure from the underlying philosophy of the patent system-
which by its very structure aims to prevent the grant of monopolies to
inventions that are duplicative, obvious, or useless-such a measure
might be warranted and feasible.
First, through the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress
has already implicitly blessed such grants of exclusivity-instead of a
reward for innovative disclosure, the measures would serve as a
reward for challenging unwarranted monopolization. Second, the
patent monopoly was initially granted by the Patent Office, and
would exist but for the challenge by the third party. A limited
duopoly period, granted only in exchange for early successful
challenges not initiated under the threat of litigation, would therefore
remove an improvident monopoly that would otherwise exist for
years. Finally, the measure would have an additional positive benefit
by providing an incentive for firms-often most knowledgeable
regarding the weak patents and best suited to challenge them-to
actively read patents, thus enhancing the public disclosure of new
technologies.
Readers might find additional cognitive dissonance with the
prospect of a former patentee enjoying continued royalty payments,
whether via pre-established license or awarded through infringement
litigation, during the duopoly period on the basis of an invalidated
patent. While the discussion in this Note has erred towards limiting
awards during the duopoly period and facilitating entry by third-party
competitive firms, the exact balance between incentivizing
reexamination and equity to the public must be more clearly
delineated before any implementation, but such an "unfair"
arrangement might be a reasonable social price to pay for increased
utilization of the more efficient invalidation process offered by
reexamination. Presumptively, any patent invalidated by the
proposal of this Note would have been sufficiently strong to gain
patent protection to begin with, and the patentee will inevitably rely
129. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
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in part on this grant in its commercialization of the subject matter and
its business model as a whole. Such a reliance interest would not
suffice to preserve an improperly granted patent under the existing
schema, but its existence does serve to minimize the seeming inequity
of continued-in-part enjoyment of the monopoly by the patentee.
Taken as a whole, the duopoly period would encourage an immediate
increase in competition in the market-via entry by the challenger,
any other prior users of the subject matter, 130 and additional firms
through the increased competitive pressure for lower license costs
and lowered infringement penalties-while allowing the patentee a
transitional period to adjust their business model in accordance with
the patent invalidation.
V. Conclusion
Although reexamination provides a potentially powerful
alternative to full invalidity litigation, the deficiencies of the current
system have led to its underutilization. The appeal of the system as
an alternative to invalidity litigation is greatly diminished by the
constraints on forms of evidence considered and the grounds for
invalidity available, the limited potential for participation in the
process by challengers, and the significant risk a challenger-in many
cases a firm with a competing product that might infringe-takes in
making the citation and request for reexamination. Most proposed
reforms have focused on making the procedure more effective by
enlarging the procedure within the same context as originally
established by Congress, whether it be by such measures as allowing
additional forms of evidence to be considered or allowing invalidation
on grounds beyond anticipation and nonobviousness. While such
reforms may form an important component of successful reform, they
fail to address the central obstacle to challenges by third parties.
The incentive structure discussed by this Note, while extremely
powerful, may encourage third parties to overcome the perverse
deterrent to practice willful blindness by incentivizing them to read
and challenge patents. Any implementation of such an incentive
scheme would doubtlessly differ from that of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which is intended primarily to address issues specific to
pharmaceutical regulatory approval, but the policy concepts of the
Act could be applied via analogy to normative letters patent without
significant obstacles. If history is any indication, when Congress
130. See discussion supra Part IV.e.
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eventually returns to the question of patent reform, it will be unlikely
to implement the schema outlined in this paper. Although such
reform may seem antithetical to the core philosophy of the patent
system itself-granting limited monopolies limited to instances of true
innovation-its consideration demonstrates that non-traditional
reform and incentive schemas could mitigate many of the
shortcomings of modern patent reexamination. Such an incentive
structure, coupled with reforms to address the other shortcomings in
patent reexamination as it exists today, would do much to encourage
pre-litigation challenges and thereby increase the quality of active
patents, encouraging investment and maintaining the vitality of the
intellectual property market in the United States.
